我院教師楊培方在環(huán)境和資源經(jīng)濟學(xué)頂級期刊JEEM發(fā)表論文
我院教師楊培方與Colorado School of Mines教授 Graham Davis合作的論文“Non-renewable resource extraction under financial incentives to reduce and reverse stock pollution”近期被經(jīng)濟學(xué)期刊Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (JEEM) 錄用發(fā)表。JEEM創(chuàng)刊于1974年，是SSCI收錄期刊，由Elsevier出版社出版，是環(huán)境和資源經(jīng)濟學(xué)領(lǐng)域公認的頂級學(xué)術(shù)期刊，致力于發(fā)表這一領(lǐng)域頂尖水平的理論和實證文章。
該研究對資源開發(fā)利用造成的污染治理提出了新的理論，并論證了現(xiàn)行相關(guān)環(huán)境政策失敗的原因。以采礦造成的土壤污染為例，該論文研究了三種不同的污染成本內(nèi)部化政策：1）要求企業(yè)在生產(chǎn)結(jié)束之后進行環(huán)境修復(fù)；2）對企業(yè)在生產(chǎn)過程中造成的污染排放征稅；3）對企業(yè)生產(chǎn)過程中及生產(chǎn)結(jié)束后造成的污染存量征稅。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，采取第三種政策可以促進企業(yè)按照自己的污染控制成本選擇最有利的方式控制污染，并在閉礦之后及時進行環(huán)境修復(fù)。該研究成果對環(huán)境政策的制定提供了科學(xué)參考。論文全文請參見鏈接https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.09.007。
論文摘要：
This paper examines the impacts of three types of financial incentives on non-renewable resource extraction that produces reversible stock pollution. A particular emphasis is the timing of remediation. We show that traditional standards-based regulation incentivizes operators to delay remediation. A policy that instead requires the operator to pay ongoing damages from the pollution stock via a Pigouvian stock tax is socially optimal and provides the operator with the correct incentives to remediate the pollution stock. A Pigouvian pollution flow tax, which has been a popular recommendation in the stock pollution literature, does not generate these remediation incentives. Nor do financial assurances, also known as reclamation bonds. The financial incentives embodied in mine regulatory reform in the United States, China and Western Australia have no explicit intention of implementing a Pigouvian stock tax. They are therefore unlikely to incentivize optimally timed remediation by the firm, even though the policy reforms have been driven by a recognition that past standards-based policies were ineffective at incentivizing timely remediation.